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NOTES
Tax-CORPORATE FRANCHISE TAXATION-A TAX IN SEARCH OF AN
IDENTITY-First Union National Bank v. Florida Department of
Revenue, 502 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
N McCulloch v. Maryland,' the United States Supreme Court
announced that the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion forbids state taxation of the properties, functions, or instru-
mentalities of the federal government. Since then, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held on constitutional grounds that federal
property, or income derived therefrom, may not be the direct ob-
ject of taxation by a state.2 Conversely, the Court has also held
that states may include federal property, or the income derived
from it, in taxing a corporate franchise.'
A "corporate franchise" is a grant by the state of the privilege to
do business within the state.4 A tax by the state on that privilege is
a corporate franchise tax. Before 1959, these "franchise" taxes
were upheld on the theory they were levied on a distinct interest,
the corporate franchise, rather than on the property serving as the
measure of the tax.8 Any effect that the tax had on property com-
posing the tax base was characterized by the Court as incidental,
so long as the tax was truly on the corporate franchise. The Court
focused on whether the franchise tax directly affected federal prop-
erty. A finding that the tax did directly affect federal property in-
validated the tax. The Court reasoned that a franchise tax directly
affecting federal property must be aimed at the federal property,
not the franchise.
1. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. See New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 665 (1950); Macallen Co.
v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620 (1929); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275
U.S. 136 (1927); Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713 (1927).
3. See Tradesman Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 560 (1940); Educa-
tional Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1932); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594
(1889); Provident Inst. v. Massachusetts, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 611 (1867).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 307 (5th. ed. 1979). A corporate franchise is defined as the
"right or privilege granted by the state or government ... to exist and do business as a
corporation ..... Id.
5. See Werner Mach. Co. v. Director of Taxation, 350 U.S. 492, 493-94 (1956); Society
for Say. v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1955); Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Fairweather, 263
U.S. 103, 112 (1923); Home Say. Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U.S. 503, 518-19 (1907).
6. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855 (1983).
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In 1959, Congress enuciated a new standard of inquiry by
amending the Public Debt Statute.7 This amendment barred con-
sideration of federal property either directly or indirectly in the
assessment of a state tax with express exceptions for franchise
taxes and estate and inheritance taxes. In American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Dallas County, the Court concluded that whether the tax
directly or indirectly affected federal property was no longer deter-
minative; judicial inquiry would consider instead whether the tax
fell within one of exceptions created by the 1959 amendment.'
The tax at issue in American Bank was levied on bank shares.
The Court reasoned that if Congress had intended to include bank
share taxes in the statute's exceptions it would have done so; since
it did not, the tax was constitutionally invalid as tax exempt fed-
eral bonds were considered in its measurement.9 Had the tax
claimed to have been on corporate privilege, the Court would have
had to determine whether it was a bona fide franchise tax, as the
amendment grants an exception for "franchise" taxes. The Court,
however, has not set forth criteria for making that determination;
American Bank is only one of two Supreme Court cases on corpo-
rate franchise taxation decided since 1959.1
The 1959 amendment also required that a franchise tax be non-
discriminatory. 1 The Court has interpreted a franchise tax as non-
discriminatory when it remains consistent for all forms of taxable
property.' 2 A franchise tax which discriminates in favor of obliga-
tions issued by the state and against similar obligations of the fed-
eral government violates the implicit limitation placed on one gov-
ernment's power to tax the other." Whether similar property
refers to a class of property such as bonds or to specific property
within the class is still unclear.
7. 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1959), 31 U.S.C. § 3124's predecessor provided:
[A]ll stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States,
shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority.
This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either
the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indi-
rectly, in the computation of the tax, except nondiscriminatory franchise or other
nonproperty taxes in lieu thereof imposed on corporations and except estate taxes
or inheritance taxes.
8. 463 U.S. at 864.
9. Id.
10. See also, Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392, 397 (1983).
11. See American Bank, 463 U.S. at 855.
12. Memphis Bank, 459 U.S. at 397-98.
13. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977); Tradesmens Nat'l Bank
v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 560 (1940).
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In this Note the author examines the recent decision of Florida's
First District Court of Appeal in First Union National Bank v.
Florida Dept. of Revenue. 4 The author examines that case and
recent decisions by the Montana and New Jersey Supreme Courts
to demonstrate the uncertainty in the area of corporate franchise
taxation and recommends the United States Supreme Court elimi-
nate this uncertainty by clarifying the definition of a nondiscrimi-
natory franchise tax within the meaning of the current Public Debt
Statute."5
I. EARLY SUPREME COURT CASES
States may generally tax all subjects over which the sovereign
power of the state extends, but they "have no power by taxation,
or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control
the constitutional laws enacted by Congress "1.... 6 State tax laws
that infringe on the federal government's ability to "borrow money
on the credit of the United States1 7 could prevent the government
from responding properly to a national crisis. Such laws are viewed
by the Court as a potential threat to the nation's welfare.18 A state
tax on a franchise granted to a private corporation is not rendered
invalid, however, merely because the tax includes federal property
in its measure. The Court recognizes that the privilege of exercis-
ing the corporate franchise is a legitimate object of taxation by the
states. 9 Conducting business in a corporate capacity has been
deemed a valuable right allowing individuals to unite under a com-
mon name for business purposes, permitting succession of owner-
ship without dissolution or suspension of business, and providing
limited individual liability for corporate owners.2 0 As a condition
for granting the franchise, or for its continued exercise, the state
14. 502 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
15. 31 U.S.C. § 3124 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Stocks and obligations of the United States Government are exempt from
taxation by a State or political subdivision of a State. The exemption applies to
each form of taxation that would require the obligation, the interest on the obliga-
tion, or both, to be considered in computing a tax except-(1) a nondiscrimina-
tory franchise tax or another nonproperty tax instead of a franchise tax, im-
posed on a corporation; and (2) an estate or inheritance tax. [emphasis added].
16. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435 (1819).
17. See Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 464 (1829).
18. Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 599 (1890).
19. Id. at 599-600.
20. Id. at 600.
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may constitutionally require the corporation to pay a sum set by
the state legislature.21
In 1890, in Home Insurance Co. v. New York, the Supreme
Court concluded that the mode of assessing a corporate franchise
tax was purely a matter of legislative discretion.22 The Court de-
clined to suggest a more equitable form of taxation when all artifi-
cial entities subjected to the tax receive similar treatment. Any
remedy for hardship or oppression created by the payment of the
tax "must be sought by appeal to the legislature of the State; it
cannot be furnished by the federal tribunals. 2 3
In Home Insurance, the insurance company claimed the New
York tax was not a true franchise tax but was instead an income
tax on the capital stock or property of the company. Therefore, it
argued, the tax was invalid because a portion of its capital stock
was invested in United States securities. 2 4 The franchise tax was
imposed on any corporation doing business in New York State and
was measured by the extent of dividends generated by the corpora-
tion during the current tax year. The Court, however, rejected the
argument that inclusion of federal securities in the measure of the
tax was constitutionally objectionable. The Court found nothing to
contradict the statute's designation of the tax as being upon the
capital stock of the corporation. Moreover, relying principally on
two earlier decisions, Society for Savings v. Coite25 and Provident
Institution v. Massachusetts,2' that examined whether the tax was
on the corporate franchise or on the underlying property, the
Court concluded that the tax's validity was unaffected by the mode
of assessment chosen by the state.27
The Court held in Coite that a Connecticut franchise tax law
requiring savings banks to pay a sum equal to three fourths of one
per cent of the total deposits held on a certain date in each year,
was a tax on the franchise of the corporation, not upon its prop-
erty."' Reasoning that "[n]othing can be more certain in legal deci-
sion than that the privileges and franchises of a private corpora-
tion, and all trades and avocations by which the citizens acquire a
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 597.
24. Id. at 595.
25. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 594 (1867).
26. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 611 (1867).
27. Home Ins., 134 U.S. at 600.
28. Coite, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 610.
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livelihood, may be taxed by a State for the support of the State
government," '29 the Court found the validity of the tax "unaffected
by the fact that the corporation or individual has or has not made
investment in Federal securities." 30 The amount of deposits was
not the subject matter of the tax, but instead served as the basis
for computing the tax to be paid."
Similarly, in Provident Institution, the Court distinguished a
franchise tax from a property tax by noting "the amount of a
franchise tax depends upon the business transacted by the corpo-
ration and the extent to which [it has] exercised the privileges
granted in [its] charter."32 One half of the challenged tax was lev-
ied on the average amounts of deposits for the six months preced-
ing the first day of May, and the other half on the average amount
of deposits for the six months preceding the first day of November.
The Court held that because no nexus existed between the average
amount of the deposits and the amount of property owned by the
corporation, the tax was a franchise tax on the corporation for the
privileges it enjoyed pursuant to it's charter being approved by the
State of Massachusetts; it was not a tax on the corporate property.
A. Macallen v. Massachusetts
Forty years after the Home Insurance decision, the Court in Ma-
callen Co. v. Massachusetts, struck down an excise tax levied an-
nually on domestic corporations doing business in Massachusetts.3
The Court found that the act authorizing the tax was, in substance
and effect, a tax on federal bonds and securities. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court appears to have retreated from, or at least
limited, its holding in Home Insurance that a tax upon the exer-
cise of corporate privilege may be based on income derived from
federal property.
The Court in Macallen concluded that the controlling principle
in evaluating a franchise tax statute "is that the state cannot tax
the instrumentalities or bonds of the United States, or ... the in-
come derived therefrom, directly or indirectly-that is to say, it
cannot tax them in any form.' Apparently, the Court feared a
state legislature could circumvent prohibitions on directly taxing
29. Id. at 606-07.
30. Id. at 607.
31. Id. at 611.
32. Provident Inst., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 632.
33. 279 U.S. 620 (1929).
34. Id. at 629 (emphasis in original).
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federal property by deceptively characterizing or naming the tax.
Such legislation would destroy the implicit constitutional limita-
tions placed on the power of the state to tax property of the fed-
eral government.
Particularly indicative of the Massachusetts Legislature's desire
to tax federal property were amendments deleting that portion of
the original act which expressly excluded interest received from
bonds, notes and certificates of indebtedness of the United States
in measuring the tax. This distinct change indicated to the major-
ity that the legislature sought to subject previously exempt federal
securities to state taxation.35
Writing for the dissent, Justice Stone disagreed with the major-
ity's finding that the Massachussetts Legislature intended to tax
federal securities. He reasoned that Massachusetts was simply
seeking to implement what the Court had said on numerous occa-
sions it could constitutionally do, include tax exempt federal prop-
erty in the measure of a franchise or excise tax.38 Because both
federal and state bonds were included in the assessment of the tax,
he concluded the purpose was to tax corporations for doing busi-
ness in the state, not to tax previously exempt federal property. He
also reasoned that neither the state nor federal government can
exercise its taxing power without affecting the other. The Court
should apply a practical construction to a challenged franchise tax-
ing statute so both governments may function with a minimum of
interference.
B. Educational Films Corp. v. Ward and Pacific Co. v. Johnson
Three years after Macallen, the Court in Educational Films
Corp. v. Ward37 and Pacific Co. v. Johnson,8 adopted the ration-
ale of Stone's dissent in Macallen and reaffirmed earlier Court de-
cisions upholding the validity of franchise taxes that incidentally
affect tax exempt property. The inclusion of tax exempt state
bonds in the measure of a franchise tax was challenged in Pacific
Co., while state taxation of federal property was at issue in Educa-
tional Films. The character of the exempt property, however, does
not alter the analysis; the corporate franchise must be the object of
taxation.
35. Id. at 631-32.
36. Id. at 636 (Stone, J., dissenting).
37. 282 U.S. 379 (1931).
38. 285 U.S. 480 (1932).
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Writing for the majority in Educational Films, Justice Stone
concluded that Macallen did not represent a departure from the
Court's prior rulings doctrine upholding corporate franchise taxes;
rather the state tax in Macalien was invalidated because it was
specifically intended to impact on exempt federal property.39 If the
avowed purpose or self-evident operation of a statute is to directly
tax bonds of the United States, then the statute must fail.40 How-
ever, a state tax may be upheld despite any incidental effect it may
have upon the federal bonds if it was passed with an intent other
than to specifically tax such bonds.41
The New York franchise tax in dispute in Educational Films
was assessed annually on every domestic corporation for the privi-
lege of exercising its franchise in the state. Payable in advance, it
was levied at a rate of four and one-half percent on the corpora-
tion's entire net income for the previous fiscal year. 2 "Entire net
income" included all income received on stocks and all interest re-
ceived from federal, state, municipal or other bonds.43 The corpo-
ration argued that the tax was invalid to the extent that it in-
cluded royalties received by the corporation from motion picture
copyrights obtained from the United States government. These
copyrights were alleged to be federal property and, as such, implic-
itly excluded from state taxation by the United States
Constitution."
While implicitly agreeing with Educational Film's argument that
the copyrights were federal property, the Court rejected the thrust
of the corporation's argument. Looking at the operation of the
New York statute, the Court found the tax to be "for the privilege
of doing business in one year measured by the allocated income
accruing during the preceding year.' 45 The Court reasoned that if
the corporation had ceased to do business before the date of
assessment:
[I]t would not have been subject to any tax under [the] statute,
although it had received, during its preceding fiscal year, income
which the statute makes the measure of the tax. Since it can be
levied only when the corporation both seeks or exercises the privi-
39. Educational Films, 282 U.S. at 392.
40. Id. at 393 (quoting Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713, 715 (1927)).
41. Miller, 272 U.S. at 715.
42. Educational Films, 282 U.S. at 385.
43. Id. at 386.
44. Id. at 388.
45. Id. (quoting New York v. Jersawit, 263 U.S. 493, 496 (1922)).
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lege of doing business in one year and has been in receipt of net
income during its preceding fiscal year, the tax, whatever descrip-
tive terms are properly applicable to it, obviously is not exclu-
sively on income apart from the franchise.4
6
Likewise, in Pacific Co. v. Johnson, a California franchise tax on
corporate income earned during the preceding fiscal year was up-
held even though tax exempt property was within its measure.47
Pacific Company claimed tax exempt state bonds acquired before
the enactment of the statute authorizing the tax were immune
from state taxation. The inclusion of interest derived from these
bonds in the tax's assessment allegedly impaired the bonds' con-
tractual obligation to be free from state taxation in contravention
of the Constitution's contract clause.
Adhering to the rule followed earlier that term in Educational
Films, "that a tax upon a franchise, measured by net income, in-
cluding that from tax immune property, is not an infringement of
the immunity, '4 8 the Court held the tax exempt status of the
bonds did not embrace the corporate franchise. The owners of the
bonds were free to enjoy the tax exempt status of their bonds until
they asked for and received from the state the benefit of the taxa-
ble corporate privilege. At that point, the corporate owners com-
mitted themselves to the payment of the tax which the state ex-
acted as its price for the corporation's receipt and exercise of the
privilege to do business in the state.
A statute authorizing a franchise tax "must be read as a whole..
and the legislative purpose in enacting it must be taken, regard-
less of forms of words, to envisage the obvious consequences which
flow from its operation. '49 While apparently determining that the
California statute was specifically adopted to reach exempt prop-
erty, the Court concluded that in operation it placed an equal bur-
den on owners of exempt and nonexempt property. The absence of
discriminatory treatment resulted in the Court's ruling that the
statute did not impair the bonds' contractual obligation to be free
from state taxation.
Justice Sutherland relied on Macallen in his dissent.50 A report
from a special commission appointed by the California Legislature
46. Id.
47. 285 U.S. 480 (1932).
48. Id. at 490.
49. Id. at 495.
50. Id. at 496 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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to investigate taxation of banking institutions recommended
adopting net income as the base of the tax since it was "the only
practicable method of securing revenue from the banks."51 Accord-
ing to Justice Sutherland, this report served as the impetus for the
legislature's passage of the franchise tax statute and clearly evi-
denced the legislature's desire to tax exempt property.
The majority, however, did not evaluate legislative intent to de-
termine whether the tax was on the corporate franchise although
they did look at legislative intent in evaluating whether the tax
had a discriminatory effect. The majority did not rest its decision
on the precise language in the statute, the commission report or
the order of provisions incorporated into the statute.5 2 Those fac-
tors could neither enlarge nor diminish the constitutional power of
the state to tax the corporate franchise.
The Court concluded in Pacific Co. and Educational Films that
the operation of a franchise tax statute determines the tax's na-
ture.63 Both cases were decided prior to congressional action which
created an exception to the general judicial rule that state taxes
cannot directly consider federal property. Before the 1959 amend-
ment to the Public Debt Statute, which allowed the consideration
of federal property in the measurement of franchise taxes and es-
tate and inheritance taxes, the Court was concerned with the stat-
ute's effect on tax exempt property. Therefore, the Court would
look to either the treatment afforded exempt versus nonexempt
property or the mode of assessment to determine the effect. It is
unclear whether the rationale applied by the Court to franchise
taxation prior to 1959 may be used to determine the nature of
state franchise taxes challenged under the current Public Debt
Statute.
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court do not clarify the charac-
teristics of a franchise tax. In 1956, in Werner Machine Co. v. Di-
rector of Division of Taxation, the Court accepted the finding of
the New Jersey Supreme Court that a state franchise tax imposed
on a corporation's net worth was a "bona fide" franchise tax de-
spite the inclusion of federal bonds in the tax's measurement."
51. Id. at 497-98.
52. Id. at 498.
53. Id. at 495.
54. 350 U.S. 492, 493 (1956).
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Furthermore, the New Jersey Legislature's express declaration that
the tax was a franchise tax weighed heavily in the Court's deci-
sion." Did the Court in Werner Machine reject the conclusion in
Educational Films that the nature of a franchise tax is determined
by the statute's operation? The only two Supreme Court decisions
relating to state taxation of the corporate franchise issued after
Werner Machine and the 1959 amendment, American Bank &
Trust Co. v. Dallas County6 and Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v.
Garner,'17 do not anwser this question.
In American Bank, the Court held that a Texas property tax on
bank shares, computed on the basis of the bank's net assets with-
out deduction for exempt federal securities, violated 31 U.S.C. §
742.58 The 1959 amendment extended the tax exempt status of fed-
eral securities to "every form of taxation that would require that
either . . . [federal] obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be
considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax,
except nondiscriminatory franchise or other nonproperty taxes in
lieu thereof imposed on corporations and except estate taxes or in-
heritance taxes."5'
Prior to the amendment, the method of computing the tax was
irrelevant so long as the tax did not directly affect federal prop-
erty.60 The Court reasoned that the tax was imposed on a "transac-
tion separate from the ownership of federal obligations."61 Still,
the Court recognized that "the practical impact of such a tax is
indistinguishable from that of a tax imposed directly on corporate
assets that include federal obligations. '62 The amendment made
the method of assessment relevant to a determination of the tax's
constitutionality. A tax is invalidated by the consideration of fed-
eral property either directly or indirectly in assessing the tax, un-
less it falls within one of the amendment's exceptions.
The amendment's exception for franchise taxes implies that the
tax must be a bona fide franchise tax. The Court in American
Bank, however, did not define a bona fide franchise tax. If the ra-
tionale used in Educational Films applies to the successor to 31
55. Id. See also Society for Say. v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143 (1955).
56. 463 U.S. 855 (1983).
57. 459 U.S. 392 (1983).
58. American Bank, 463 U.S. at 865.
59. 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1959).
60. American Bank, 463 U.S. at 864.
61. Id. at 863-64.
62. Id. at 862.
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U.S.C. § 742, 31 U.S.C. § 3124, then the method of assessment may
determine whether the tax is a bona fide franchise tax. However, as
previously noted, it is unclear whether the rationale of cases de-
cided before American Bank can define corporate franchise taxes
within the meaning of the current Federal Public Debt Statute.
The 1959 amendment to 31 U.S.C. § 742 also required a state tax
to be nondiscriminatory." In Memphis Bank, the Court concluded
that "nondiscriminatory" within the context of § 742 meant that a
state tax whose economic but not legal incidence falls on federal
property must impose an equal burden on holders of similar state
property.6 4 The Court found the Tennessee bank tax was discrimi-
natory as income from federal obligations was included in the tax
base but income from comparable state obligations was not.65
When a state taxing statute operates discriminatorily, it violates
the rule that states cannot directly tax property of the federal gov-
ernment. Consequently, the Court has interpeted a finding of dis-
criminatory effect to demonstrate that the purpose of a tax is to
reach otherwise tax exempt federal property despite legislative lan-
guage to the contrary.66
III. STATE COURT DECISIONS
State courts have struggled to reconcile American Bank with Su-
preme Court decisions issued prior to the 1959 amendment to 31
U.S.C. § 742. In Schwinden v. Burlington Northern Inc.,67 the
Montana Supreme Court reversed an earlier decision in First Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Association v. Department of Revenue,68
finding the state's corporate license tax was in conflict with the
Federal Public Debt Statute. The tax provided that when the cor-
porate taxpayer computes allowable deductions from gross income,
those deductions are decreased by a ratio of federal interest in-
come to all income earned by the corporation.6' The court con-
cluded the net effect of the tax was to add back to taxable income
interest income from federal obligations for the purpose of deter-
mining the tax. 0 Under 31 U.S.C. § 3124, the successor to 31
63. See supra note 7.
64. Memphis Bank, 459 U.S. at 397.
65. Id. at 398-99.
66. See Werner Mach. Co. v. Director of Taxation, 350 U.S. 492, 493-94 (1956).
67. 691 P.2d 1351 (Mont. 1984).
68. 200 Mont. 358, 654 P.2d 496 (Mont. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1144 (1982).
69. Schwinden, 691 P.2d at 1354.
70. Id. at 1355.
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U.S.C. § 742, Montana could not impose such a tax unless the tax
was a nondiscriminatory franchise tax.
Originally, the Montana court found the tax in First Federal to
be on the corporate privilege and on net income .7 The state's ar-
gument that the tax was imposed for the privilege of doing busi-
ness in the state and was measured by net income was rejected as
being a distinction without a difference. The court reasoned that
the tax could not simultaneously be both a nonproperty and a
property tax and found that the state was attempting to tax fed-
eral debt obligations through indirect means. 2
After reexamining First Federal, the court in Schwinden, con-
cluded that American Bank approved state consideration of inter-
est income from federal property either directly or indirectly in the
measure of a nondiscriminatory franchise tax. 3 While the court
recognized that a distinction exists between a tax on a privilege
measured by federal property and a tax on the property itself, the
court did not identify how it determined this distinction.
Similarly, in Garfield Trust Co. v. Director, Division of Taxa-
tion, the New Jersey Supreme Court failed to explain how it con-
cluded that the state's corporation business tax was a tax on corpo-
rate privilege. 4 The court merely stated that it was upholding the
tax for the same reasons as it had in Werner Machine.7 5 In Werner
Machine, the court found that the New Jersey corporation busi-
ness tax was intended by the legislature to be a bona fide franchise
tax and did not tax property in the commonly accepted sense. 6
The absence of factors other than intent indicates that the New
Jersey court and the Montana court relied primarily on intent to
determinine whether the tax was imposed on the corporate
franchise. Legislative declarations of intent, however, should not
determine if a tax is a bona fide franchise tax. As the Supreme
Court concluded in Educational Films, the nature of the tax
should be determined by the statute's operation.
71. First Fed. Say., 200 Mont. 358, 654 P.2d 496 (1982).
72. Schwinden, 691 P.2d at 1351.
73. The court reasoned that 31 U.S.C. § 3124 (1983), expressly distinguishes between
nondiscriminatory franchise taxes and property taxes. Id. at 1358.
74. 102 N.J. 420, 508 A.2d 1104 (N.J. 1986).
75. Id. at 1107.
76. See Werner Mach. Co. v. Director of Taxation, 17 N.J. 121, 110 A.2d 89 (1954), affd,
350 U.S. 492 (1956).
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IV. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA
Recently, in First Union National Bank v. Florida Department
of Revenue, 7 Florida's First District Court of Appeal was faced
with determining the factors distinquishing a franchise tax from an
income tax. The challenged statute imposed a franchise tax, in lieu
of the corporate income tax, on banks for the privilege of doing
business in the state.78 The tax was based on net income of the
current fiscal year including interest income earned from federal
debt obligations. The bank argued that the tax was not a true
franchise tax as the tax was substantively indistinquishable from
the Florida corporate income tax. The Florida bank tax was al-
leged by First Union to be no more than a mislabeled income tax. 9
Focusing on the operation and practical effect of the statute, the
First District Court held that, because the bank tax operated in
the same manner as the Florida corporate income tax, the bank tax
was an income tax.80 Both taxes were measured by adjusted federal
income for the current tax year, both were imposed on corpora-
tions for the privilege of doing business in the state and both pos-
sessed identical tax rates. The only difference the court found was
the statutory label.8'
The court also implicitly rejected legislative intent as a factor
distinquishing franchise taxation from other forms of taxation. The
court focused instead on similarites between the Florida bank tax
and the state's corporate income tax. Because the Florida bank tax
and the Florida corporate income tax were substantively indistin-
quishable, the bank tax was found to be an income tax.8 2 This ra-
tionale is similar to that adopted by the Montana Supreme Court
in First Federal, which was later rejected by that court in
Schwinden.
The mode of assessment also contributed to the Florida district
court's finding that the Florida bank tax and the Florida corporate
income tax were substantively indistinquishable. The Florida bank
tax was levied on adjusted federal income for the current tax
77. 502 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
78. See FLA. STAT. § 220.63 (1979). This section imposed a five percent tax that was
increased to five and one-half percent applicable to years beginning on or after Sept. 1,
1984. The Florida corporate income tax rate is five percent. Id.
79. First Union, 502 So. 2d at 965.
80. Id. (citing Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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year.8" In a footnote, the court cited United States Supreme Court
cases which expressly approved franchise taxes measured by pre-
ceding year's net income.8
In contrast to the New Jersey and Montana Supreme Courts'
reliance on legislative intent, the view implicitly adopted by the
Florida district court in First Union, that the exercise of the
franchise and imposition of the tax should coincide, is logical given
the absence of a United States Supreme Court ruling on the issue.
If the tax is imposed on income as earned, the corporation can
never pinpoint the value of the franchise; it can only estimate what
value it believes the franchise will acquire in the future. On the
other hand, if the tax is imposed on preceding year's net income or
on corporate net worth, the corporation will know in advance the
value of the franchise. For example, if Corporation A decides to do
business in State X and State X imposes a corporate franchise tax
on the preceding year's net income, Corporation A will not pay a
franchise tax during its first year of doing business in the state. It
will pay a franchise tax only if it decides to do business for a sec-
ond year and that decision will be influenced by the value the
franchise acquired during the previous year. By contrast, if Corpo-
ration A decides to do business in State Y, which levies a franchise
tax on income as earned, Corporation A must pay a tax on a
franchise that has no intrinsic value until it is exercised.
As with the payor of an estate or inheritance tax, taxes which
may constitutionally include federal debt securities in their mea-
sure, the payor of a franchise tax should be able to value the
franchise before choosing to do business. If the amount of the tax
is indeterminable until action is taken, then the tax should be
properly classified as a property tax. A true corporate franchise tax
would not require that a business speculate as to the value of the
corporate franchise.
The Public Debt Statute's requirement that the tax be nondis-
criminatory was not addressed by the Florida court in First Union
because the court found that the tax was not a franchise tax.85 If
the Florida Supreme Court disagrees with the First District Court
of Appeal's determination that the Florida bank tax is a property
tax, it must then apply the United States Supreme Court's ambig-
uous definition of a nondiscriminatory tax to the statute. The
83. See FLA. STAT. § 220.63 (1979).
84. First Union, 502 So. 2d at 965 n.4 (citing Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax
Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924), and Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931)).
85. Id. at 965 n.3.
CORPORATE FRANCHISE TAX
United States Supreme Court has defined a nondiscriminatory
franchise tax as a tax that treats federal property and similar state
property the same." It is unclear, however, whether "similar prop-
erty" refers to specific kinds of property or to general classes of
property.
For instance, in First Union, the bank argued that the Florida
franchise tax discriminated against tax exempt federal property by
providing certain exemptions and tax credits to in-state invest-
ments.8 7 Section 348.94(2) Florida Statutes provides for an exemp-
tion from taxation for bonds issued by the Pasco County Highway
Authority."8 Although no such bonds had been issued, the bank ar-
gued that the legislature's enactment of the exemption gave rise to
the possiblity of discrimination against tax exempt federal prop-
erty."9 The Supreme Court has stated that any discrimination
whatsoever will invalidate a franchise tax."
If "similar property" refers to a class of property such as bonds,
then the bank's argument is correct and the tax is discriminatory.
The exemption for Pasco County Highway bonds does favor those
bonds over federal bonds generally. However, if "similar property"
refers to identical state and federal property, then the bank's argu-
ment has no merit since the federal government does not issue
highway bonds."
The bank also argued that the Florida Legislature's extension of
tax credits to users of gasohol and providers of financial assistance
for public redevelopment, and granting a tax deduction for con-
struction of hazardous waste facilities discriminated against tax ex-
empt federal property and favored in-state property.92 Contrary to
the bank's argument, however, neither the tax credits nor the de-
duction discriminate against tax exempt federal property. The fed-
eral government does not issue bonds for gasohol use, public rede-
velopment or the construction of hazardous waste facilities.9 3 Since
86. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392, 397 (1983).
87. Brief for First Union National Bank at 29, First Union Nat'l Bank v. Florida Depart-
ment of Revenue, 502 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
88. See FLA. STAT. § 348.94(2) (1979).
89. Memphis Bank, 459 U.S. at 397.
90. Id.
91. The federal government funds highway construction through congressional
appropriations.
92. Brief for First Union National Bank at 29, First Union Nat'l Bank v. Florida Depart-
ment of Revenue, 502 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
93. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 40 (1982) (tax credit on gasohol use); 41 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (1982)
(financial assistance for public redevelopment); 26 U.S.C.A. § 468 (1982) (tax deduction for
certain hazardous waste facilities).
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the federal government extends tax credits in these areas, the
state's extension of the credits and the deduction does not conflict
with federal policy but rather supplements its purposes. Moreover,
for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3124, tax credits and deductions do not
create property.
IV. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the recent decisions of Florida's First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, the Montana Supreme Court and the New
Jersey Supreme Court, lower courts have encountered difficulty in
deciding the constitutionality of state franchise tax statutes under
31 U.S.C. § 3124. The United States Supreme Court should set
specific criteria distinguishing a franchise tax from a property tax.
The Court should also clarify the meaning of "similar property."
Unless the Court addresses these issues in a timely fashion, those
states implementing corporate franchise tax statutes will be unable
to determine whether their statutes comply with 31 U.S.C. § 3124.
As a result, substantial amounts of state revenue could be lost if
the state statute cannot withstand a constitutional challenge.
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